Can I still file a direct action against trucking company’s insurance company? 

Answer: Only if the carrier is an intra-state carrier licensed in Oklahoma, under 47 O.S. § 230.30.  Fierro v. Lincoln Gen. Ins. Co., 2009 OK CIV APP 62, 217 P.3d 158 says you can no longer join out-of-state carrier’s insurance company due to single state registration statute.

Answer: Because, as you accurately point out, there is no private right of action, you probably can’t introduce them independently. Historically, we have been able to have our expert use them as an industry standard and get them in that way. However, effective November 1, 2009, House Bill 1603 (The Civil Immunity for Lawbreakers Act) comes into effect. Section 19 of HB 1603 amends 12 O.S. Sec. 2703 to add the language: “Facts or data that are otherwise inadmissible shall not be disclosed to the jury by the proponent of the opinion or inference unless the court determines that their probative value in assisting the jury to evaluate the expert's opinion substantially outweighs their prejudicial effect.”

Answer: The employee’s personal coverage will attach to the city, his employer. The policy will define 3 categories of insured: (1) named insured and member of household, (2) permissive users and (3) person’s legally responsible for the actions of insureds in the first two categories. Just dismiss the employee and proceed against the city.

Answer: You are not wrong. Bohanan v. Allstate, 1991 OK 64, 820 P.2d 787, reconciles Pate v. MFA, 1982 OK CIV APP 36, 649 P.2d 809 (Oklahoma law applies to invalidate med-pay subrogation, a result contrary to the law of Arkansas, where the policy was issued) , with Rhody v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 771 F.2d 1416 (10th Cir. 1985), (Texas law applies to prevent stacking where policy was issued in Texas but loss occurred in Oklahoma) on the ground that 36 O.S. Sec. 6092 purports on its face to apply to any med-pay existing in the state (wherever issued) while the Oklahoma UM statute purports to apply only to policies issued in Oklahoma. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., et al. v. The State Board for Property and Casualty Rates, 1981 OK 153, 637 P.2d 1251, treats subrogation and set-off the same and forbids set-off of med-pay against UM because of Sec. 6092. Your opponent is just wrong about their interpretation of Bohanan.

Answer: Yes, an employee of a tenant is an invitee of the landlord. The cases actually go a long way beyond that, holding that a social guest of a tenant is an invitee. See: Sagona v. Sun Co., Inc., 2002 OK CIV APP 93, 57 P.3d 879 (wife of tenant visiting him in building housing his office, injured in an elevator, was an invitee.) See also Crane Co. v. Sears, 1934 OK 375, 35 P.2d 916: “This liability of the landlord in such cases is not limited to the tenant personally, but includes all persons who, within the contemplation of the parties, were to use the premises under the lease.”

Answer: Your problem is that you can’t bind the trucking company by a finding in the probate to which it was not a party. It has a due process right to litigate that issue. See: State Mut. Life Assurance Co. v. Hampton, 1985 OK 19, 696 P.2d 1027, 1033 (acquittal of wife in a criminal case of killing her husband could not preclude his heirs proving she killed him because of their due process right not to be bound by the finding in a case to which they were not parties.)

Answer: I think you are thinking of Equity Ins. Co. v. City of Jenks, 2008 OK 27, 184 P.3d 541 and Equity Ins. Co. v. St. Clair, 2008 OK 79, 196 P.3d 981. These hold that a cancellation notice issued while the premium is not yet in default that the policy will be canceled if the premium is not paid when due is not an effective cancellation notice.

Answer: No. In response to Plaster, the next legislature (in1990) amended subsection G of Section 3636 to change “The named insured may reject” to “A named insured may reject.”

Answer: See: Hudgens, et al., v. Cook Ind., Inc., 1973 OK 145, 521 P.2d 813: Where risk of harm foreseeable, one in commercial enterprise which involves integral part of the business, selection of motor carriers, owes duty to exercise reasonable care to select a competent carrier. Citing Nat. Trailer Convey, Inc. v. Saul, 375 P.2d 922, 923 and overruling Marion Machine Foundry & Supply v. Duncan, 101 P.2d 813. One of the problems with the trucker was that it was uninsured, although that doesn’t seem to be the principal thrust of the case.

Answer: I would be concerned about the “one judgment” rule. That rule states that there can be only one judgment arising out of a given set of operative facts and that once you take that judgment, you cannot obtain a second judgment on the same operative set of facts. See: Retherford v. Halliburton Co., 1977 OK 178, 527 P.2d 966. What is commonly done is to have the court find the defaulting defendants in default but defer entering judgment against them until the issues are determined as to the non-defaulting judgments and then entering judgment against all defendants for the amount of the judgment found against the non-defaulting defendants.